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COMMENTS
CORPORATE AMERICA-MAKING A KILLING: AN ANALYSIS
OF WHY IT IS APPROPRIATE TO HOLD AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS WHO FUND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
LIABLE FOR AIDING AND ABETTING TERRORISM
I. INTRODUCTION
American people must understand this war on terrorism will be fought on
a variety of fronts, in different ways.... We will starve the terrorists of
funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding
places and bring them to justice .... We have developed the international
financial equivalent of law enforcement's "Most Wanted" list. And it puts
the financial world on notice. If you do business with terrorists, if you
support or sponsor them, you will not do business with the United States
of America.... Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations. Today,
we're asking the world to stop payment ....
Al Manar is the network television station of Lebanon's Party of God,
more commonly known as Hezbollah.2 Al Manar enjoys tremendous influ-
ence in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East, as it reaches nearly 10 mil-
lion viewers each day.' According to Avi Jorisch, a Soref research fellow at
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Al Manar's avowed purpose
is "to wage psychological warfare."4 The station spews hatred for both Israel
and the United States by encouraging and recruiting suicide bombers as it
seeks to accomplish the goals of Hezbollah.5 Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed
and Iranian-funded group which has been implicated in numerous terrorist
attacks against primarily the United States and Israel.6 Some of these include
the 1982 attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241
Americans; the 1984 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 12
Americans; and the 1994 attack on the Israeli Embassy and Jewish cultural
1. President George W. Bush, Address at The Rose Garden (Sept. 24, 2001) (emphasis
added).
2. Avi Jorisch, Hezbollah Hate With a U.S. Link: Subsidiaries' TV Ad Money Serves an
Odious Goal, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 2002, at M5.
3. Richard Byrne, Desperately Seeking Hezbollah (Dec. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news-features/other-stories/multipage/documents/025
98656.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2003) (on file with author).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Jorisch, supra note 2.
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center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people.7 Sheik Hassan Izz-Adin, a mem-
ber of Hezbollah's political council and director of Hezbollah's media rela-
tions unit which directly oversees Al Manar, stated: "America will fall just
like the Romans and the British. While it now controls the world, this will
change. We cannot accept American domination and American terrorist ac-
tions."8 Furthermore, U.S. and European Intelligence officials and terrorism
experts suggest that Hezbollah is "increasingly teaming up with al Qaeda on
logistics and training for terrorist operations," including the "coordination on
explosives and tactics training, money laundering, weapons smuggling and
acquiring forged documents."9 The United States placed Hezbollah on its
terrorist list in 1995.10
Even more shocking than the Hezbollah terrorist regime against Amer-
ica and Israel is the financial support that Al Manar enjoys from Lebanese
subsidiaries of major American corporations, including PepsiCo, Proctor &
Gamble and Western Union. 1 These corporations, among others, buy air
time from Al Manar to advertise their products in the Middle East. The U.S.
has placed all branches of Hezbollah under a ban, including its media net-
work, because it believes that even Hezbollah's "charitable wings are
'fronts' to funnel money to support terrorism." 2 The American government
recognizes the threat to America itself and America's ally, Israel, and to
Middle Eastern peace. The American government has waged financial war
against such terrorist groups. 13 And yet, major American corporations,
through their Middle Eastern subsidiaries, actively finance this terrorist
group by paying to advertise their products via Al Manar.
This comment discusses whether it is appropriate to hold corporations
liable for aiding and abetting terrorism through the financing of terrorist or-
ganizations. Part II discusses the criminal liability imposed on individuals or
entities that fund terrorist groups. It does so by detailing statutory provisions
as well as case law. Part III explores the concept of holding corporations civ-
illy liable for aiding and abetting terrorism. Specifically, it will discuss cor-
porate liability for aiding and abetting terrorism under the Seventh Circuit's
7. Id. See also Dana Priest & Douglas Farah, Terror Alliance Has U.S. Worried; Hezbol-
lah, Al Qaeda Seen Joining Forces, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002, at A01 (discussing the fol-
lowing: the 1983 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, where a Hezbollah suicide bomber
killed 63 people, including 17 Americans and six of the CIA's top Middle East experts; the
suicide bombing six months later that killed 58 French and 241 American servicemen, the
largest peacetime loss for the U.S. military; the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers (U.S. military
housing complex in Saudi Arabia) for which Hezbollah's intelligence officer, Imad Mughni-
yah, was implicated, killing 19 U.S. servicemen; and the mid-1980s kidnapping of 18 Ameri-
cans in Lebanon, three of whom were executed).
8. Jorisch, supra note 2.
9. Priest & Farah, supra note 7.
10. Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
11. Jorisch, supra note 2.
12. Byrne, supra note 3.
13. President George W. Bush, Address at The Rose Garden (Sept. 24, 2001).
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analysis in Boim v. QLI and HLF14, and the Ninth Circuit's analysis of cor-
porate liability for aiding and abetting international human rights violations
in Doe v. Unoca115. Finally, part IV will apply both analyses to the issue of
this comment, namely whether American corporations can be held liable for
aiding and abetting terrorism when they give money to terrorist organiza-
tions by advertising on their networks. It will also thoroughly discuss the ur-
gent policy considerations requiring courts to hold these corporations liable
for aiding and abetting terrorism, as demonstrated by a trend of cases as well
as the national and international war against terrorism.
II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR PROVIDING FUNDS TO TERRORISTS
The United States prohibits individuals and corporations from funding
terrorism under statutory provisions and case law. Moreover, along with vio-
lating national law, providing such funds to terrorist groups constitutes a vio-
lation of international law.
A. Statutory Provisions
Title 18 of the United States Code provides that a federal cause of action
exists against anyone who "provides material support or resources... know-
ing or intending that they are to be used in preparation" for an act of terror-
ism. 6 This crime is punishable by fines or imprisonment for not more than
15 years or both; however, if the death of any person results from the terror-
ist act, imprisonment may be for any number of years or for life. 7 It is sig-
nificant to note that Congress intended this to apply to any individual or en-
tity that knows or intends for its funds to be used to carry out terrorist acts.
Thus, knowledge that one's funds will be used for the preparation or carry-
ing out of a terrorist act, without intent that the funds be used for such pur-
pose, is sufficient to hold the provider of the funds criminally liable. Like-
wise, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B maintains that:
Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a for-
eign terrorist organization.., shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life."
Here, Congress completely removed the requirement of intent, requiring
only that a provider know the funds are going to a terrorist organization.
14. 291 F.3d 1000 (2002).
15. 2002 WL 31063976 (9 th Cir. 2002).
16. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A (2002) (emphasis added).
17. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A (2002).
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (2002) (emphasis added).
2003]
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Criminal liability for funding terrorist organizations will therefore lie with
any person or organization that knowingly provides material support to ter-
rorists.19 Knowledge that the funds are going to a terrorist organization is
therefore sufficient for criminal liability.
Congress explains why knowledge alone, without intent, is sufficient for
liability in its statutory findings: "foreign organizations that engage in terror-
ist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to
such an organization facilitates that conduct."' The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit furthers this rationale in its decision not to allow plain-
tiffs to donate money to the charitable branch of two designated terrorist or-
ganizations: "[m]aterial support given to a terrorist organization can be used
to promote the organization's unlawful activities, regardless of donor intent.
Once the support is given, the donor has no control over how it is used."21
The intent of the provider of funds exercises no influence on the terrorists'
use of the funds and therefore has no bearing on the issue of liability.
Furthermore, the United States is a Party to the International Convention
on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which prohibits the provi-
sion of financial assistance to terrorist organizations:
22
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if
that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully,
provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry
out ... [an act of terrorism or] any other act intended to cause death or se-
rious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person .... -23
This Convention applies to direct involvement or complicity in the pro-
vision of funds to terrorists, with the intention or knowledge that any part of
the funds may be used for terrorist acts. Knowledge alone, without intent, is
therefore sufficient for liability under the Convention.
This is likely due in large part to the Parties "[b]eing convinced of the
urgent need to enhance international cooperation among States in devising
and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terror-
ism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of
19. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (2002); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A (defining "material support or
resources" as "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identifica-
tion, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel,
transportation, and other physical assets," but does not include humanitarian assistance to per-
sons not directly involved in such violations).
20. Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising; Congressional Findings and Pur-
pose Act, reprinted in Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 301(a)(7),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247.
21. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
22. International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10,
2000, 39 I.L.M. 268, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 9, 1999.
23. id. at arts. (1)(a) and (b) (emphasis added).
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its perpetrators."' The provision of such funds is an offense whether or not
the funds are actually used to carry out the proscribed act.'
B. Case Law
United States courts have upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.S. §§
2339A and 2339B. First, in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held both provisions to be constitutional and within
the federal government's power to enact.26 In that case, the plaintiffs desired
to give support to the nonviolent, humanitarian and political activities of a
designated terrorist organization. They therefore sought a preliminary
injunction barring enforcement of 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2339A and 2339B against
them.27 The plaintiffs claimed both provisions were unconstitutional because
they criminalize the giving of support to an organization regardless of
whether the donor intends to further the organization's unlawful activities.28
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' claims, explaining that "there is no
constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving terrorists the weapons
and explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions.... [n]or, of
course, is there a right to provide resources with which terrorists can buy
weapons and explosives."29 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' at-
tack on the provisions because they prohibit the provision of material sup-
port even if the donor does not have the intent to aid in the unlawful activity:
[miaterial support given to a terrorist organization can be used to promote
the organization's unlawful activities, regardless of donor intent. Once the
support is given, the donor has no control over how it is used. We there-
fore do not agree ... that the First Amendment requires the government to
demonstrate a specific intent to aid an organization's illegal activities be-
fore attaching liability to the donation of funds.30
The court found that because the restriction of support was aimed spe-
cifically at stopping aid to terrorist groups, the federal government had the
power to enact such laws and that much latitude would be given to the gov-
ernment in "selecting the means to bring about the desired goal."31 The court
then noted Congress' explicit finding in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B, that "foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that con-
24. Id. at Intro.
25. United Nations Summary of the International Convention on the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/ter-
sumen.htm#4 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
26. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135.
27. ld. at 1133.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1134.
31. Id. at 1136.
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duct."32 From this, the court notes, "it follows that all material support given
to such organizations aids their unlawful goals," either because the organiza-
tion uses the funds for terrorist activities, or because the contribution frees
up other monies to be used for terrorist activities.33 Therefore, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld Title 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2339A and 2339B as constitutional and
within the federal government's power to enact.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's analysis and treatment of Title 18
U.S.C.S. §§ 2339A and 2339B was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
2002.3' There, plaintiffs argued the provisions would "chill legitimate fund-
raising for humanitarian purposes," and asked the court to reject the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno.35 The Seventh Cir-
cuit refused to do so, noting the government's "paramount" interest in pre-
venting terrorism and upholding 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2339A and 2339B as consti-
tutional.36 Thus, case law demonstrates the validity and constitutionality of
the criminal statutes regarding the provision of funds to terrorist organiza-
tions, even though the statutes do not require an intent to further terrorist ac-
tivities for criminal liability.
I1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PROVIDING FUNDS TO TERRORISTS
Along with imposing criminal liability for funding terrorists, Title 18 of
the United States Code provides civil remedies for victims of international
terrorism. Moreover, recent case law demonstrates that an individual or cor-
poration that provides funds to a terrorist organization may not only be held
criminally liable for providing the funds, but may also be held civilly liable
for aiding and abetting terrorism.
A. Statutory Provisions
Title 18 U.S.C.S. § 2333 specifically provides civil remedies for victims
of international terrorism:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or
business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate,
survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the
United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains
and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees. 37
32. Id. (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 301(a)(7), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 [hereinafter AEDPA]).
33. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136.
34. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 291 F.3d
1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1027.
37. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2333(a) (2003).
[Vol. 40
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International terrorism includes activities that "involve violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State. 38 Conduct giving rise to criminal liability un-
der 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2339A and 2339B, namely funding terrorist organiza-
tions, has indeed been classified as conduct that "involve[s] violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life," and may therefore meet the definition of in-
ternational terrorism under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2333. 39 Furthermore, while fund-
ing itself is not sufficient to constitute an act of international terrorism under
18 U.S.C.S § 2331, funding that meets the definition of aiding and abetting
terrorism does in fact create liability under §§ 2331 and 2333.'o
B. Case Law
Current case law suggests that corporations who provide funds to terror-
ist organizations by advertising on their networks may be civilly liable for
aiding and abetting terrorism. Such corporate liability will be discussed be-
low, relying primarily on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Doe v. Unocal.
1. Aiding and Abetting Analysis Under Boim v. QLI and HLF
In a case of first impression, the Seventh Circuit discussed the liability
of defendant corporations who supplied funds to the terrorists responsible for
the death of David Boim, Plaintiffs' son.4 The court found two theories of
liability by which Plaintiffs could proceed, namely, that conduct giving rise
to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B may meet the definition of
international terrorism as used in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2333, and funding that meets
the definition of aiding and abetting an act of terrorism creates civil liability
under 18 U.S.C.S §§ 2331 and 2333.42
Seventeen-year-old David Boim held dual citizenship in the United
States and Israel. The Boims were living in Israel in 1996, where David was
studying at a yeshiva.43 On May 13, 1996, David was waiting with fellow
students at a bus stop when he was murdered by two members of the military
wing of Hamas." The Boims describe Hamas as "an extremist, Palestinian
38. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2331(I)(A) (2003).
39. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015.
40. Id. at 1028.
41. Id. at 1001.
42. Id. at 1028.
43. Id. at 1002.
44. Id. Both men responsible for the murder were apprehended and then released pending
trial. One man died in a suicide bomb attack, killing five people and injuring 192 others. The
other confessed at trial to his participation in David's murder and was sentenced to ten years'
imprisonment. Id.
2003]
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militant organization that seeks to establish a fundamentalist Palestinian
state."45 Hamas has two branches, one political and one military. It seeks to
advance its political objectives through acts of terrorism and acts to prevent
Middle East peace by violently attacking civilians.' Hamas enjoys a "global
presence," as terrorist operatives in Gaza and the West Bank receive their
instructions, funds, weapons and practical support for their terrorist acts
from Hamas organizers throughout the world. In fact, the Boims allege that
Hamas has command and control centers in the United States, Britain and
several Western European countries. I Hamas was designated as a terrorist
organization in 1995 by Executive Order."
The Boims allege that Hamas' military wing depends on foreign contri-
butions, and that defendants Quaranic Literacy Institute (QLI) and the Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), are the main fronts for
Hamas in the United States. 9 In other words, it is alleged that QLI and HLF
mask their mission of raising money for Hamas in support of terrorist activi-
ties with a humanitarian, charitable front.5 The Boims allege such monies
were used to buy terrorist materials, such as vehicles, machine guns and
ammunition, which were used to kill their son.51
The Seventh Circuit held that two theories of liability exist against the
corporations who allegedly funded Hamas, the terrorist organization respon-
sible for the death of David Boim. First, criminal liability under 18 U.S.C.S
§§ 2339A and 2339B may meet the civil definition of international terror-
ism. Second, funding that meets the definition of aiding and abetting creates
civil liability for injuries incurred in the terrorist acts.
In its first theory of liability, the Seventh Circuit held that "Congress
undoubtedly intended that the persons providing financial support to terror-
ists should also be held criminally liable for those violent acts."'52 The court
noted sections 2339A and 2339B further Congress' goal to cut off the flow
of money to terrorists by imposing criminal liability on those who give fi-
nancial support to terrorist organizations. 53 The court found no reason, textu-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
49. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1003.
50. Id. ("QLI is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that purports to translate and publish
sacred Islamic texts, but the Boims believe it is also engaged in raising and laundering money
for Hamas." Id. QLI employed one defendant, Salah, who is the admitted United States based
leader of the military branch of Hamas. Salah is named on a list of Specially Designated Ter-
rorists compiled by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Id.
HLF is also a non-profit corporation whose purported mission is to fund humanitarian relief.
HLF's director has acknowledged providing money to Hamas, and the Boims allege this is
HLF's true mission.) Id.
51. Id. at 1004.
52. Id. at 1014 (further noting that the Congressional record for section 2333 "indicates
an intention to cut off the flow of money in support of terrorism generally").
53. Id.
[Vol. 40
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 40 [2003], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol40/iss1/6
CORPORATE AMERICA-MAKING A KILLING
ally, structurally, or logically to construe civil liability, imposed by section
2333, more narrowly than its corresponding criminal provisions:
Because Congress intended to impose criminal liability for funding violent
terrorism, we find that it also intended through sections 2333 and 2331 (1)
to impose civil liability for funding at least as broad a class of violent ter-
rorist acts. If the plaintiffs could show that HLF and QLI violated either
section 2339A or section 2339B, that conduct would certainly be suffi-
cient to meet the definition of "international terrorism" under sections
2333 and 2331.14
Therefore, acts sufficient to constitute criminal liability for financing
terrorism would be sufficient to meet the definition of "international terror-
ism" under 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2331 and 2333.
The Seventh Circuit also found that corporations could be held civilly
liable for acts of international terrorism through an aiding and abetting the-
ory. Aiding and abetting liability extends liability beyond those who actually
engage in the proscribed conduct to reach those who do not engage in that
conduct at all, but who give a certain degree of aid to those who do.55 In
Boim, the court held that aiding and abetting liability was available for 18
U.S.C.S. §§ 2331 and 2333, despite the fact that the statute did not expressly
provide for such. 6 The court expressed four reasons for allowing this.
First, section 2333 involves an express right of action for plaintiffs who
are injured by reason of an act of international terrorism, rather than an im-
plied right of action. Courts are much more likely to infer Congressional in-
tent to extend aiding and abetting liability when such an express right ex-
ists.57 When only an implied right of action exists, courts are reluctant to pile
inference upon inference. 8 Second, the court found that Congress, in the
terms and history of section 2333, expressed its intent to apply general tort
law principals. 59 Such principles include aiding and abetting liability.60
Third, Congress expressed its intent in section 2333 to "render civil liability
at least as extensive as criminal liability in the context of the terrorism
54. Id. at 1015.
55. Id. at 1018.
56. Id. at 1020. (Defendants argued that aiding and abetting liability was not an option
for §§ 2331 and 2333 because the Supreme Court held in Central Bank v. First International
Bank that a private plaintiff could not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 since such liability was not covered by the statute);
see Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177-
78, 183-84 (1994) (developing a statute-by-statute approach to determine whether Congress
intended to extend aiding and abetting liability to a civil statute).
57. Id. at 1019-1020 (stating "[i]t is not much of a leap to conclude that Congress in-
tended to extend section 2333 liability beyond those persons directly perpetrating acts of vio-
lence.... [Tihe statute itself defines international terrorism so broadly--to include activities
that 'involve' violent acts").
58. Id. at 1019.
59. Id.
60. Id.
20031
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cases."61 Criminal liability attaches to aiders and abettors of terrorism under
18 U.S.C. § 2339B,62 and therefore civil liability should attach as well.
Finally, Congress' purpose to thwart financing of terrorism cannot be
met unless liability attaches beyond the persons directly involved in the acts
of terrorism: "if we failed to impose liability on aiders and abettors who
knowingly and intentionally funded acts of terrorism, we would be thwarting
Congress' clearly expressed intent to cut off the flow of money to terrorists
at every point along the causal chain of violence." '63 Moreover, the court
notes that "there would not be a trigger to pull or a bomb to blow up" with-
out the necessary resources to acquire such weapons of terrorism." Thus, the
Seventh Circuit ruled that aiding and abetting liability could be attached to
sections 2331 and 2333. However, in an unusual twist to its general purpose,
the court then adds another requirement: for a defendant to be liable for aid-
ing and abetting terrorism, there must be intent to further the unlawful act.
The court states the Plaintiffs must "prove that the defendants knew of
Hamas' illegal activities, that they desired to help those activities succeed,
and they engaged in some act of helping the illegal activities."6 5
2. Aiding and Abetting Analysis Under Doe v. Unocal
The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed corporate liability for aiding
and abetting human rights violations in Doe v. Unocal.' Under the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of aiding and abetting, American corporations may be li-
able for aiding and abetting international terrorism through advertising on
terrorist-owned networks.
In 1988, the Myanmar Military established a state owned company,
Myanmar Oil and Gas, to produce and market the nation's oil and gas re-
sources.67 Four years later, in 1992, Myanmar Oil licensed a French oil com-
pany, Total, to produce, transport, and market natural gas from deposits off
the coast of Myanmar.68 This was referred to as "the Project."69 Also in
1992, Unocal acquired a twenty-eight percent interest in the Project from
Total.7° Unocal set up a subsidiary, the Unocal Myanmar Offshore Com-
pany, in Myanmar to manage its gas production interest in the Project and
another subsidiary, the Unocal International Pipeline Corporation, to manage
61. Id.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2003) (creating liability for aiding and abetting violations of any
other criminal provisions).
63. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1021.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1023.
66. See generally Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002).
67. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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its gas transportation interest in the Project.71
It was undisputed that the Myanmar Military provided services, such as
security, for the Project, and that Unocal was aware of this.72 Unocal was
likewise aware that the Myanmar Military was allegedly committing human
rights violations in connection with the Project. 73 The Plaintiffs filed suit
against Unocal, alleging its civil liability for aiding and abetting the human
rights violations.74
The Ninth Circuit provided an extensive analysis of third party liability
in its Unocal decision. The relevant theories from that analysis for holding
American corporations liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism
are federal common law tort principles and international law.
a. Federal Common Law Tort Principle: Reckless Disregard
The Ninth Circuit recognized three federal common law tort principles
by which Unocal could be held liable for aiding and abetting the human
rights violations: joint venture liability,7" agency liability76 and reckless dis-
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2. Several documents demonstrate Unocal's understanding and awareness of
the Myanmar Military's provision of security: a 1995 Unocal memorandum stated that "[flour
battalions of 600 men each will protect the [pipeline] corridor" and "[f]ifty soldiers will be
assigned to guard each survey team." Id. Likewise, a 1995 Unocal briefing document states
that "[a]ccording to our contract, the government of Myanmar is responsible for protecting the
pipeline." Id. (emphasis omitted). Again, a 1995 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Myanmar
reported that Unocal's on-site representative "stated forthrightly that the companies have
hired the Burmese military to provide security for the project." Id. (emphasis omitted). Fi-
nally, Unocal's on-site representative indicated that "TotallUnocal uses [aerial photos, preci-
sion surveys, and topography maps] to show the [Myanmar] military where they need heli-
pads built and facilities secured." Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *4. Unocal was made aware by its own consultants and partners in the Project,
the Control Risk Group. Id. Furthermore, Unocal's Vice President of International Affairs and
Unocal's representative expressed knowledge of the forced labor. Id.
74. Id. at *3. Plaintiffs alleged that "the Myanmar Military forced them, under threat of
violence, to work on and serve as porters for the Project." Id. Plaintiffs further alleged that
"the Myanmar Military subjected them to acts of murder, rape, and torture." Id. at *4. One
woman alleged that she and her baby were thrown into a fire after her husband tried to escape,
severely injuring her and killing her baby. Id. Other villagers spoke of the summary execu-
tions of those who refused to work or who were too weak to work effectively. Id.
75. 46 Am. JuR. 2D, Joint Ventures § 1 (1994).
A joint venture is frequently defined as an association of persons, with intent, by
way of contract, express or implied, to engage in and carry out a single business
venture for joint profit, for which purpose such persons combine their property,
money, effects, skill, and knowledge, without creating a partnership, a corporation,
or other business entity, pursuant to an agreement that there shall be a community
of interest among the parties as to the purpose of the undertaking, and that each
joint venturer must stand in relation of principal, as well as agent, as to each of the
other coventurers within the general scope of the enterprise.
Id. See also 46 Am. JuR. 2D, Joint Ventures § 41 (1994) (requiring both parties to be able to
act as both principal and agent), and 46 AM. Jus. 2D, Joint Ventures § 16 (2002) (explaining
that co-venturers act as both principals and agents because they mutually share the right to
control and manage the business).
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regard. Due to the specific confines of this comment, analyzing American
corporations' liability for aiding and abetting terrorism by advertising on ter-
rorist-owned networks, the distant nature of the relationship between the
American corporations and the terrorist organizations likely renders joint li-
ability and agency liability irrelevant. Reckless disregard, on the other hand,
provides a strong basis for holding the American corporations liable for aid-
ing and abetting terrorism. As such, this comment will only review the
court's analysis of the federal common law tort principle of reckless disre-
gard.
Two theories of recklessness or reckless disregard exist under federal
common law." The first is civil-law recklessness, or "objective reckless-
ness." 8 The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he civil law
generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act)
fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either
known or so obvious that it should be known."79 The second theory of reck-
less disregard is criminal law's "subjective recklessness," or "willful reck-
lessness."8 This doctrine requires "actual knowledge of a substantial risk
which the defendant subsequently disregards."8 "Deliberate indifference"
has also been found to constitute willful recklessness. In Farmer, the Su-
preme Court noted that "[w]ith deliberate indifference lying somewhere be-
tween the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the
other, the Courts of Appeals have routinely equated deliberate indifference
with recklessness." 82
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has stated that intent is irrele-
vant under reckless disregard: "[p]roof of even willful recklessness does not
require proof of intent; it requires only that a defendant have acted in con-
scious disregard of known dangers."83 Likewise, in Medina v. City of Den-
76. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D, Agency § 1 (2002) (stating that an agency relationship is estab-
lished when the parties create "a fiduciary relationship by which a party confides to another
the management of some business to be transacted in the former's name or on his or her ac-
count, and by which such other assumes to do the business and render an account of it") and 3
AM. JuR. 2D, Agency § 1 (2002) (explaining that an agency relationship is one in which the
agent acts in the principal's place).
77. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *34.
78. Id.
79. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (holding that a prison official could not
be liable for "denying the inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the officials knew
of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety..." when an inmate alleged
that prison officials violated his 8"h Amendment rights by their "deliberate indifference to his
safety") (citing W. Keeton, et. al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 34 (5th ed.
1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965)).
80. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *34.
81. Id. (citing Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 513 (6th Cir. 2002)).
82. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (stating that "[iut is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing
to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the
equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.").
83. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *35.
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ver, the court stated:
reckless intent does not require that the actor intended to harm a particular
individual; reckless intent is established if the actor was aware of a known
or obvious risk that was so great that it was highly probable that serious
harm would follow and he or she proceeded in conscious and unreason-
able disregard of the consequences. Thus, reckless intent involves disre-
gard of a particular risk rather than intent to cause a particularized
harm.8
In Unocal, the Ninth Circuit found that, assuming the plaintiffs' factual
allegations were true, Unocal could be liable for aiding and abetting the hu-
man rights violations under the subjective or objective standards by choosing
to use the Myanmar Military in connection with the Project. 5 This is true
because Unocal had actual knowledge that the Myanmar Military would
likely use forced labor and engage in human rights abuses if it provided the
security for the Project. And despite ample warnings and acknowledgements
of the risk, "Unocal recklessly disregarded that known risk, determined to
use and in fact did use the services of that military to perform pipeline-
related tasks, and thereby set in motion international law abuses that were
foreseeable to Unocal. ' 6
b. International Law
The Ninth Circuit found that Unocal could also be liable for aiding and
abetting human rights violations under principles of international law. Those
principles "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or
by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."8 International law
is an appropriate avenue to address because "[i]t is ... well settled that the
law of nations is part of federal common law." 8 Among the various sources
for ascertaining international law, the statutes and recent decisions of the In-
84. Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (granting summary
judgment in favor of police who recklessly pursued a felon and injured Plaintiff, not because
reckless behavior was not a means for liability but because the police were entitled to quali-
fied immunity) (quoting Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 n.8 (10th Cir. 1990)) (em-
phasis added).
85. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *35.
86. Id. at *34.
87. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
88. In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (plain-
tiff's son was tortured and killed by military personnel acting under the authority of the Presi-
dent of the Philippines); see also Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *12 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating four reasons for applying international law: (1) "the needs.., of the international sys-
tem" are better served by applying international law, rather than national law; (2) "the rele-
vant policies of the forum" are better served by looking at different areas of law, including
international law; (3) it is consistent with case law to apply international law, and it is similar
to the Restatement Second of Torts; and (4) it satisfies the "basic polic[y]... to provide tort
remedies for violations of international law").
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ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are particularly relevant.89
To be liable under an aiding and abetting theory, the International Tri-
bunals require the demonstration of both the actus reus and mens rea ele-
ments. The ICTY held that "the actus reus of aiding and abetting in interna-
tional criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."'
The ICTY clarified, holding that the "assistance need not constitute an indis-
pensable element, that is, a condition [sic] sine qua non for the acts of the
principal."' Instead, the acts must only "make a significant difference to the
commission of the criminal act[s] by the principal."92 Similarly, the ICTR
defines the actus reus of aiding and abetting as "all acts of assistance in the
form of either physical or moral support" that "substantially contribute to the
commission of the crime." 93
The second element necessary for aiding and abetting is mens rea. To
meet this element, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia requires actual or constructive (i.e. reasonable) "knowledge that [the]
actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime."94 It is
therefore "not necessary... to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the
sense of positive intention to commit the crime." 95 Furthermore, it is not
even necessary that the aider and abettor knows of the exact crime that the
principal intends to commit. Instead, the ICTY held that if the defendant "is
aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one
of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the com-
mission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor." 96 Likewise, the
ICTR finds the mens rea element satisfied if the accused "knew of the assis-
tance he was providing in the commission of the principal offence." 7 Like
the ICTY, the ICTR does not require one to have the intent to commit the
89. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *12 (quoting Mechinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp.
2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002)).
90. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 1 235, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999),
reproduced/reformatted on website for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (Feb. 10, 1999) available at http://www.un.org/icty (last visited Oct. 3, 2003)
(Defendant, a leader of the Croatian Defense Council Military Police, was liable for aiding
and abetting his officers' interrogation methods, which included torture to extract informa-
tion).
91. Id. 1 209; see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 1 391 (Feb.
22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003).
92. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 1233, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999).
93. Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, 91 126 (Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
94. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 1245, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, 1 180 (Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
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principal offense.98 Instead, it is sufficient if the aider and abettor "knew or
had reason to know" that the principal had the intent to commit the offense.99
Thus, under international law, one may be liable for aiding and abetting
a principal offender by providing any type of assistance with the knowledge
of the principal's intent to commit the offense. Knowledge alone is sufficient
for aiding and abetting liability. Intent to commit the act, or intent for the
principal to commit the act, is unnecessary.
Because the standards set forth above by the ICTY and the ICTR are
similar in nature to the standard for aiding and abetting under domestic tort
law, the Ninth Circuit felt justified in applying it. The Restatement of Torts
states: "[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he... (b) knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encourage-
ment to the other so to conduct himself.""
In Doe v. Unocal, the Ninth Circuit found that the actus reus element of
aiding and abetting was satisfied, assuming Plaintiff's allegations were true,
based on Unocal's practical assistance to the Myanmar Military's use of
forced labor. This assistance took the form of hiring the Military to provide
security; hiring the Military to build infrastructure along the pipeline; and
Unocal's use of photos, surveys and maps to show the Military where to
provide such security and build such infrastructures.01 The court further
noted that Unocal' s assistance had a "substantial effect" on the use of forced
labor which "most probably would not have occurred in the same way"
without someone hiring the military and showing them where to provide se-
curity and build infrastructures.10 2
Likewise, the court found a reasonable fact finder could conclude that
Unocal met the mens rea element of aiding and abetting (actual or construc-
tive knowledge that their actions would assist the commission of the crime).
The evidence indicates that Unocal knew the Military was using forced la-
bor. 103 Moreover, Unocal knew or should have known that its assistance in
hiring, paying and instructing the Military about where to build and provide
security "would assist or encourage the Myanmar Military to subject Plain-
tiffs to forced labor."'" Therefore, under principals of international law and
tort law, Unocal could be liable for aiding and abetting the Myanmar Mili-
tary in its commission of human rights violations. In the same way, Ameri-
can corporations who know, or should know their funds are going to a terror-
ist organization, should be liable for aiding and abetting terrorism.
98. Id.
99. Id. 182.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
101. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *14. -
102. id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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IV. HOLDING U.S. CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR
PROVIDING FUNDS TO TERRORISTS
As described in the introduction of this comment, American corpora-
tions, including PepsiCo, Proctor & Gamble, and Western Union, currently
allow Lebanese subsidiaries of their companies to advertise their products on
Al Manar, the official media network of the international terrorist organiza-
tion, Hezbollah.10 This necessarily entails payment from the American cor-
porations to Hezbollah's media network,"0 6 which ultimately means that U.S.
corporations are providing funds to a known terrorist organization. Corpora-
tions, such as PepsiCo, Proctor & Gamble and Western Union, who fund ter-
rorist organizations by choosing to advertise their products on terrorist tele-
vision, should be held liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism.
A. Liability Under the Boim Analysis
As discussed in detail above, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant
could be civilly liable for aiding and abetting terrorism if the defendant knew
of the illegal activities, the defendant engaged in some act of helping the il-
legal activities, and the defendant desired to help those activities succeed.107
The first and second requirements for aiding and abetting terrorism are easily
fulfilled. While the third requirement, a desire or intent for the terrorist activ-
ity to succeed, may not be present, that requirement is entirely unfounded
and misplaced, as will be discussed below.
First, the American corporations must know of the illegal activities.
Hezbollah was listed as a designated terrorist organization in 1995."' s Addi-
tionally, Hezbollah and its media network, Al Manar, have become nation-
ally and internationally known in their attacks on American and Israeli citi-
zens. The American corporations, therefore, had sufficient information
regarding Hezbollah to know of its terrorist activities.
Second, the corporations must engage in some act of helping the illegal
activities. The American corporations are providing funds to Hezbollah. As
Congress noted: "[f]oreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are
so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organi-
zation facilitates that conduct."' °9 Thus, the corporations indeed aid the ille-
gal activities by giving Hezbollah any amount of money, for whatever pur-
105. Jorisch, supra note 2.
106. Id. ("Why are local Lebanese subsidiaries of major American corporations-like
PepsiCo, Proctor & Gamble and Western Union-lending comfort and support to terrorists by
advertising on Hezbollah television?")
107. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 291 F.3d
1000, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002).
108. Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
109. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) (emphasis
added).
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pose. Even if the corporations' specific funds are not used to further terrorist
activities, their funds free up other funds to be used for such purposes.
Third, the Seventh Circuit would require the corporations to intend to
further the unlawful act in order to be liable for aiding and abetting terror-
ism. This requirement is more than questionable; it is, in fact, rather perplex-
ing. If, as the court noted in Boim, Congress intended to impose civil liability
upon the same people it imposed criminal liability upon for financing terror-
ists,110 the court should not place a higher requirement for civil liability than
that required for criminal liability. Intent, therefore, should not be required
for civil liability when it is not required for criminal liability. The fact that
the court did require intent for civil liability demonstrates that it likely mis-
read sections 2339A and 2339B: "Congress has made clear... through the
criminal liability imposed in sections 2339A and 2339B, that even small do-
nations made knowingly and intentionally in support of terrorism may meet
the standard for civil liability in section 2333.""' 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A says
"knowing or intending," and section 2339B says "knowingly provides" ma-
terial support." 2 The court therefore either misread those sections, mistaking
the "or" for an "and," or it completely contradicted its prior statement indi-
cating that civil liability should be imposed upon the same people criminal
liability should be imposed upon. Either way, the requirement of intent has
no rational place or purpose in civil liability for aiding and abetting terror-
ism.
Moreover, when a funder has the knowledge that his money is going
into the hands of terrorists and therefore could be used to fund terrorist ac-
tivities, but does not intend for his money to be used that way, his conduct is
no less culpable than one who does intend for his money to further terrorist
activity. His funds are no less useful to the terrorist organization and the risk
of mass death and terror becomes no less prevelant simply because that par-
ticular funder, though knowing how his funds could be used, did not want
them to be used in such a manner. As the Ninth Circuit unequivocally stated,
"[m]aterial support given to a terrorist organization can be used to promote
the organization's unlawful activities, regardless of donor intent. Once the
support is given, the donor has no control over how it is used." H 3 Intent is
therefore immaterial to the funding of terrorist organizations.
Placing intent into the requirements of civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting is inconsistent with the criminal counterparts of 18 U.S.C.S § 2333, and
with the very intent and purpose of Congress. Allowing a defendant to be
110. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1014 (stating "it would be counterintuitive to conclude that Con-
gress imposed criminal liability in sections 2339A and 2339B on those who financed terror-
ism, but did not intend to impose civil liability on those same persons through section 2333").
111. Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
112. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A (2002) and 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B (2002).
113. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that Plaintiffs could not provide material support to the charitable wings of two organizations
that had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations).
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free from liability when he clearly knew his funds were going to a terrorist
organization, simply because a plaintiff cannot show the defendant desired
for the terrorist activities to succeed, would indeed thwart Congress' goal of
putting an end to the financing of terrorism. Knowledge that one's funds will
be, or could be, used for terrorist activities is just as culpable as the intent for
them to be used that way.
B. Liability Under the Unocal Analysis
The American corporations may also be liable for aiding and abetting
terrorism by advertising on terrorist-owned networks based on the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of corporate liability in Unocal. Liability in this case could
be attached under both the reckless disregard and international law theories.
1. Federal Common Law Tort Principle: Reckless Disregard
As noted above, there are two types of reckless disregard. The first is
civil law recklessness, or objective recklessness, when "a person... acts or
(if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiable high
risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known."'" 4
The second theory of reckless disregard is the criminal law's subjective reck-
lessness, or willful recklessness,"i5 requiring "actual knowledge of a substan-
tial risk which the defendant subsequently disregards.""' 6 Finally, deliberate
indifference has also been found to constitute willful recklessness." 17
First, U.S. corporations who give money to terrorist owned networks in
order to advertise their products on those networks are liable under civil law
recklessness, or objective recklessness. These corporations are acting "in the
face of an unjustifiable high risk of harm," namely that Hezbollah will use
the funds provided by the corporations to further its acts of terrorism. There
is no higher risk of harm than the loss of life itself. Moreover, even if the
corporations successfully claimed they did not know Hezbollah owned Al
Manar or that Hezbollah was an international terrorist organization, both
facts are so obvious they should have been known. Indeed, Hezbollah has
been officially designated as an international terrorist organization since
1995.8 Moreover, several newspapers have made the connection between
Al Manar and Hezbollah and have made very clear Hezbollah's designation
as a terrorist organization. 9
Furthermore, it is likely that U.S. corporations have fulfilled subjective
reckless disregard, as it is difficult to fathom how they would convince any
114. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
115. Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *34 (9th Cir. 2002).
116. Id. (citing Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 513 (6th Cir. 2002)).
117. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
118. Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
119. See generally Jorisch, supra note 2, and Byrne, supra note 3.
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reasonable fact finder they did not have actual knowledge of the risk that
comes with giving money to a terrorist organization. Very few individuals,
let alone the very corporations who advertise on Al Manar, have not heard of
Hezbollah and do not know it as a terrorist organization. This is especially
true with the recent publicity it has received for its alleged ties with Al
Qaeda.' 20
Finally, in their decision to advertise on Hezbollah television, thereby
paying funds to Hezbollah, the U.S. corporations have acted with deliberate
indifference to the risk created. They may not share Hezbollah's intent to
commit terrorist acts against America and Israel, but in an effort to sell their
products and increase profits, those corporations have chosen to advertise on
Hezbollah television, regardless of the fact that their funds may be used for
terrorist acts. Even if those particular funds are not specifically used for a
terrorist attack, at the very least, their funds will make it possible for Hezbol-
lah to free up other funds to finance an attack. Such deliberate indifference
to so serious a risk surely rises to the level of willful recklessness,'12' allow-
ing for the corporations to be liable for aiding and abetting terrorism. This is
particularly true when balanced against the corporations' real purpose for
engaging the risk: to gain higher profits.
2. International Law
As noted above, international law requires two elements to be met for
aiding and abetting. First, the actus reus element requires "practical assis-
tance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime,"122 or "acts of assistance in the form of either
physical or moral support" that "substantially contribute to the commission
of the crime.- 123 Moreover, the "assistance need not constitute an indispen-
sable element.., for the acts of the principal."'" U.S. corporations who ad-
vertise on Hezbollah television have fulfilled these definitions of actus reus
because they have provided "practical assistance" in the form of money.
Such assistance to terrorists has proven to be so substantial and effective that
the United States, along with 131 other States around the world have signed
120. See generally Priest & Farah, supra note 7.
121. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (stating that "[ilt is, indeed, fair to say that acting or
failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm... is the
equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk").
122. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 235, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, 364
(1999), reproduced/reformatted on website for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (Feb. 10, 1999) available at http://www.un.org/icty (last visited Oct. 3,
2003) (emphasis added).
123. Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, 1 126 (Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
124. Id. 209; see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 391 (Feb.
22, 2000), available at http://www.un.orglicty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003).
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the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, which prohibits the provision of financial assistance to terrorist organi-
zations. That Convention requires all Member States to enact and enforce
legislation prohibiting individuals and entities from financing terrorist or-
ganizations."2 The American corporations will therefore be unsuccessful in
alleging their financial assistance to Hezbollah is not substantial. Moreover,
the specific amount received by Hezbollah from the American corporations
in relation to the amount of money received by Hezbollah from other sources
is irrelevant in light of the fact that the assistance does not have to be "an in-
dispensable element" to Hezbollah's terrorist acts.
126
Second, a reasonable fact finder would likely find the mens rea element,
"knowledge that [the] actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of
the crime," 27 or the accused "knew of the assistance he was providing in the
commission of the principal offence,"' 28 satisfied by the corporations' ac-
tions. As discussed in the reckless disregard portion of this analysis, the U.S.
corporations will have a difficult time arguing they did not know that a ter-
rorist-owned network might use its funds, whether through donations, prof-
its, or fundraising, for terrorism. Moreover, as discussed above, the U.S.
corporations would not have to share Hezbollah's intent to commit terrorist
acts, nor would they have to know specifically what acts Hezbollah intended
to commit. Instead, with the mere knowledge that an act of terrorism "will
probably be committed, and [it] is in fact committed, [they have] intended to
facilitate the commission of that crime, and [are] guilty as... aider[s] and
abettor[s]." 29 This is especially true in light of the fact that the intent to aid
in the commission of the crime is not necessary for liability to attach to an
aider and abettor. 3 ' Thus, it is not a defense for the U.S. corporations to say
they did not intend for their funds to be used toward acts of terrorism.
Therefore, based on the Ninth Circuit's analysis for holding a corpora-
tion liable for aiding and abetting the commission of a crime (there for hu-
man rights violations and here for terrorism), U.S. corporations who provide
monetary assistance to terrorists by advertising on terrorist-owned television,
may be liable for aiding and abetting terrorism.
C. Policy Reasons For Holding U.S. Corporations Liable for Aiding and
Abetting Terrorism
Not only does the current law on aiding and abetting support the notion
that American corporations who advertise on terrorist-owned networks
125. International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, 39 I.L.M. 270, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 9, 1999.
126. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 1391 (Feb. 22, 2001).
127. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 245.
128. Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, 180 (Jan. 27, 2000).
129. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 246.
130. Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, 182.
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should be liable for aiding and abetting terrorism, but national and interna-
tional policy demand such a result. First, a trend of cases are emerging,
which allow corporations to be held liable for aiding and abetting violations
of international law. Second, holding the corporations liable is consistent
with the national and international war on terrorism.
1. Trend of Cases Holding Corporations Liable for Aiding and Abetting
Violations of International Law
It is becoming increasingly clear that corporations can be liable for vio-
lations of international law through a recent trend in United States federal
courts, international tribunals, international treaties, and practices of interna-
tional corporations.' Specifically, United States courts are consistently
holding that international law does permit corporations to be held liable, in-
ternational law holds accountable those who provide assistance to human
rights violators, and the United States has a strong interest in hearing human
rights suits.132
As discussed above in detail, the Ninth Circuit held, in Doe v. Unocal,
that Unocal could be liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses
committed by the Myanmar Military, based on Unocal's involvement and
assistance to the Military, and its knowledge of such abuses.' 3 3 Likewise, the
United States District Court in New York found a plaintiffs claim alleging
the defendant corporation aided the Nigerian Government in human rights
violations in Nigeria could proceed.'34 Furthermore, in Talisman Energy, the
court found liability could exist, despite the fact that Talisman's "primary
interest was in oil extraction, not in ethnic cleansing.. ." because "[t]he fact
that the allegedly unlawful acts also generated oil revenue does not mean
they were not war crimes."' 35
Similarly, American corporations who finance terrorist organizations by
advertising on terrorists' networks should be held liable for aiding and abet-
131. See generally Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying on this trend, specifically Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), in its refusal to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims that Defendant
aided and abetted the Sudanese Government's ethnic genocide of Christian and non-Muslim
minorities in southern Sudan).
132. Id.
133. See generally Doe v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002). See also supra
Section IV.B of this comment for a more elaborate discussion of Unocal's potential liability
under a theory of aiding and abetting.
134. See generally Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiffs allege Royal Dutch Petroleum "recruited the Nigerian police and military to sup-
press the MOSOP [Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People] ... to ensure [its] ...
activities could proceed as usual." Id. Royal Dutch "provided logistical support, transporta-
tion, and weapons to Nigerian authorities to attack Ogoni villages and stifle opposition to
[Royal Dutch's] oil-excavation activities." Id.
135. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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ting terrorism. The fact that the advertisements generate profit for PepsiCo,
Proctor & Gamble and Western Union, does not mean their funds will not
assist terrorist activities. Based on the current trend in case law, these corpo-
rations would be unsuccessful in claiming they cannot be held liable for aid-
ing and abetting terrorism because international law does not hold individu-
als or corporations liable for violating international law. The corporations
would likewise be unsuccessful in claiming they cannot be held liable be-
cause international law only holds principal offenders liable for unlawful
acts. Finally, the corporations would be unsuccessful in claiming United
States courts will not exercise jurisdiction over them.
In short, the trend in case law demonstrates these corporations should be
liable for aiding and abetting terrorism, as it is a violation of national and in-
ternational law; corporations may be held liable for violating international
law; and courts, including those in the United States, are willing to hear such
cases.
2. National and International War on Terrorism
Not only does the trend in case law indicate that American corporations
should be held liable for aiding and abetting terrorism through the financing
of terrorist organizations, the national and international war on terrorism
demands it. First, the United States has declared its unmistakable goal and
intention to fight terrorism. It has done so by enacting specific laws and
policies regarding terrorism,'36 signing treaties targeting terrorism, 3 7 and re-
peatedly addressing terrorism to the American people as well as to the na-
tions. 38
136. See generally 18 U.S.C.S. § 2331 (2003), 18 U.S.C.S. § 2333 (2003), 18 U.S.C.S. §
2339A (2002), 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B (2002).
137. Besides the most relevant treaty (International Convention on the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 268, adopted by the General Assembly Dec.
9, 1999), the United States has ratified nine other treaties in its "war" on terrorism: Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 164; Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Dec. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 565; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975;
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081;
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11080; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Inter-
national Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668; Pro-
tocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 198; and International Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 249.
138. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address at The Rose Garden (Sept. 24, 2001);
Celina B. Realuyo, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Remarks to Western Un-
ion International Compliance Conference (Sept. 18, 2002); Secretary O'Neill, Address at The
Rose Garden (Sept. 24, 2001); Secretary Colin Powell, Address at The Rose Garden (Sept.
24, 2001).
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As a means to aid its war on terrorism, the United States has specifically
and strategically launched an attack against those who fund terrorist organi-
zations: "[t]o root out terrorism, we not only need to capture terrorists and
their supporters and bring them to justice but we must stem the flow of funds
that keep them in business."'39 Congress has made clear its intention to cut
off the flow of money to terrorists because that would effectively cripple ter-
rorist organizations. United States courts have acknowledged such intent and
have given Congress much deference regarding it: "Congress' purpose...
could not be met unless liability attached beyond the persons directly in-
volved in acts of violence.... [T]here would not be a trigger to pull or a
bomb to blow up without the resources to acquire such tools of terrorism.
'14
Failing to hold American corporations liable for aiding and abetting terror-
ism when they finance such organizations by advertising on their networks,
would therefore thwart Congress' intention to cut off the flow of money to
terrorists. Moreover, allowing such corporations to pay money to terrorist
organizations severely undercuts the United State's purported war on terror-
ism.
Furthermore, American corporations should be liable for aiding and
abetting terrorism regardless of their "intentions" in paying the terrorist-
owned networks. It has been noted above and bears repeating here:
"[m]aterial support given to a terrorist organization can be used to promote
the organization's unlawful activities, regardless of donor intent. Once the
support is given, the donor has no control over how it is used."' 4' The Ninth
Circuit based this conclusion largely on Congress' explicit inclusion of a
finding into 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B, that any contribution to a terrorist organi-
zation facilitates its terrorist acts.142
In other words, all support given to terrorist organizations is deemed to
aid in their unlawful goal, regardless of whether the funder intended to fur-
ther that goal. The court further rationalized its finding with the fact that ter-
rorist organizations do not keep public books indicating where the money
given to them is used. Moreover, even if the particular donor's money is not
used in a terrorist activity, "giving support intended to aid an organization's
139. Celina B. Realuyo, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Remarks to
Western Union International Compliance Conference (Sept. 18, 2002) (referencing President
Bush's Executive Order 13224 that expands the U.S. government's power to target terrorist
organizations... "and subject their financiers and supporters to economic sanctions for aid-
ing and abetting terrorism;" and noting the multilateral institutions such as the Financial Ac-
tion Task Force and international financial institutions that the United States joined in order to
combat money laundering and terrorist financing).
140. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 291 F.3d
1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002).
141. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added).
142. Id. at 1136 (quoting AEDPA, § 301(a)(7), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
1247).
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peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts." 4 3 It
is therefore no defense that the specific donation was not used for an act of
terrorism.
Furthermore, the corporations' liability falls under an aiding and abet-
ting theory which "focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gave 'substan-
tial assistance' to someone who performed wrongful conduct, not on
whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct."' " Holding
American corporations liable for aiding and abetting terrorism when they
provide funds to terrorist-owned networks is therefore consistent with the
United States' war on terrorism. Failing to do so, on the other hand, directly
undermines and cripples the effectiveness and the ability to succeed in such
a war.
The United States is not alone in its war on terrorism by any means.
Numerous countries and the United Nations share its sentiments regarding
those who commit terrorism and those who enable terrorism through money
or other resources. The United Nations adopted UNSC resolutions 1373 and
1390, directing member states to criminalize terrorist financing as well as
adopt regimes to detect, deter, and freeze terrorist assets. 45 Moreover, Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 51/210 called upon all States to take domestic
measures that would prevent the financing of terrorist organizations, regard-
less if the funding is direct or indirect or given for a "charitable" purpose) 46
Finally, the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, which 132 States have signed and forty-three have ratified, ad-
dresses why such a Treaty is necessary:
Considering that the financing of terrorism is a matter of grave concern to
the international community as a whole, Noting that the number and seri-
ousness of acts of international terrorism depends on the financing that ter-
rorists may obtain .... Being convinced of the urgent need to enhance in-
ternational cooperation among States in devising and adopting effective
measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its
suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetra-
tors. 147
With these considerations in mind, the International Convention on the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was drafted. The International
community has seen and responded to the need to cut off the flow of money
to terrorists in order to fight terrorism effectively. It would therefore be con-
sistent with international law to hold corporations that fund terrorist organi-
zations, for whatever reasons, liable for aiding and abetting terrorism.
143. Id.
144. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
145. Celina B. Realuyo, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Remarks to
Western Union International Compliance Conference (Sept. 18, 2002).
146. G.A. Res. 51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996)91 3(f).
147. International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10,
2000, 39 I.L.M. 268, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 9, 1999.
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Finally, the American corporations should be held liable for aiding and
abetting terrorism because it simply makes no sense to do otherwise. Hez-
bollah is a known terrorist organization. It has been officially designated as a
terrorist organization since 1995.'48 The corporations therefore either know,
or reasonably should know, of Hezbollah's terrorist activities. The corpora-
tions continue to advertise on Al Manar, despite such knowledge. In other
words, the corporations, with a total and complete disregard of human life
and human rights, continue to give money to an organization which has
committed and intends to commit further acts of terrorism. It makes no dif-
ference how these corporations intend their money to be used. It makes no
difference that these corporations would rather their money not be used for
acts of terrorism, because such intentions make the terrorist acts no less de-
structive and no less fatal. If, as Congress says, terrorist organizations are
"so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution.., facilitates that
conduct," 49 then American corporations are facilitating Hezbollah's acts of
terrorism, and they must be held accountable. A disregard for life is no better
than a desire to end life. The law must not distinguish between the two; ter-
rorists certainly do not, nor do their victims. Thus, American corporations
who provide funds to terrorist-owned networks should be held liable for aid-
ing and abetting terrorism for one simple, yet compelling reason: they are
aiding and abetting terrorism.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clearly appropriate to hold American corporations liable for aiding
and abetting terrorism, when they fund terrorist organizations by advertising
on terrorist-owned networks. Ample support for this conclusion lies in the
federal common law tort principal of reckless disregard as well as interna-
tional law. Support is further found in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' hold-
ings, that corporations should be liable for aiding and abetting violations of
national and international law, when they knowingly participate in the prin-
cipal's unlawful conduct. Moreover, it will serve Congress' intent to starve
terrorists of the funding necessary to keep them in existence. Lastly, it is not
permissible to condemn the terrorists, while at the same time benefitting the
terrorists' financers. Motivation for higher profits cannot justify the risk of
human life. In short, American corporations must get it through their "make-
a-profit-at-all-costs" mind-set, that America is serious when she warns: "If
you do business with terrorists, if you support or sponsor them, you will not
do business with the United States of America."1 50
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148. Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
149. AEDPA, § 301(a)(7), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247.
150. President George W. Bush, Address at The Rose Garden (Sept. 24, 2001) (emphasis
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